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Abstract
The main topic of my research during these three years concerned biometrics and in partic-
ular the Fingerprint Liveness Detection (FLD), namely the recognition of fake fingerprints.
Fingerprints spoofing is a topical issue as evidenced by the release of the latest iPhone and
Samsung Galaxy models with an embedded fingerprint reader as an alternative to pass-
words. Several videos posted on YouTube show how to violate these devices by using fake
fingerprints which demonstrated how the problem of vulnerability to spoofing constitutes a
threat to the existing fingerprint recognition systems.
Despite the fact that many algorithms have been proposed so far, none of them showed
the ability to clearly discriminate between real and fake fingertips. In my work, after a study
of the state-of-the-art I paid a special attention on the so called textural algorithms. I first
used the LBP (Local Binary Pattern) algorithm and then I worked on the introduction of the
LPQ (Local Phase Quantization) and the BSIF (Binarized Statistical Image Features) algo-
rithms in the FLD field.
In the last two years I worked especially on what we called the “user specific” problem.
In the extracted features we noticed the presence of characteristic related not only to the
liveness but also to the different users. We have been able to improve the obtained results
identifying and removing, at least partially, this user specific characteristic.
Since 2009 the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering of the University of
Cagliari and the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering of the Clarkson Univer-
sity have organized the Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition (LivDet). I have been
involved in the organization of both second and third editions of the Fingerprint Liveness
Detection Competition (LivDet 2011 and LivDet 2013) and I am currently involved in the ac-
quisition of live and fake fingerprint that will be inserted in three of the LivDet 2015 datasets.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Among the biometric measurements [26], fingerprints are probably the best known and
popular due to their properties: universality (all we have it), duration (they do not change
during time), individuality (there aren’t two identical fingerprints) [27]. They are simple to
use because we do not need to remember any password or use any type of smartcard and,
moreover, their scan is not invasive as that of other biometric measures (such as the the
iris scan). Unfortunately it has been shown that fingerprint scanners can be fooled by an
artificial replica of a fingertip. An attacker who present to the electronic sensor a spoofed
fingerprint which reflects the pattern of ridges and valleys (respectively the dark and the
bright lines in a fingerprint image) of an authorized user could pass the system check. The
first papers on the topic of the so-called “Fingerprint Liveness Detection” [38, 37] only ap-
peared in 2002. The “liveness detection” or “fakes recognition” is used to determine whether
a biometric trait is true (it comes from a living person) or false (it comes from an artificial
replica).
In the case of fingerprints, a FLD module, independent from the recognition system, is
based on the principle that additional information is used to verify if a fingertip image is au-
thentic. Hardware based systems use additional sensors to gain measurements outside of
the fingerprint image itself to detect liveness (biometric measurements as that of the heart-
beat or the blood pressure on the fingertip). Software-based systems use image processing
methods to gather information directly from the collected fingerprint image to detect live-
ness. These methods can be divided into two main categories, static if they analyze a single
static image or dynamic if they analyze multiple images of the same fingerprint, captured
while the subject puts his fingertip on the acquisition surface for a certain time period. This
thesis is focused on the study of software-based modules with static methods.
Over the years many different algorithms have been proposed to detect liveness. Some
are based on “live” characteristic as the presence of pores and others on “fake” characteristic
like artifacts typical of an artificial replica. In recent years it has been paid a special attention
to several textural algorithms developed in the Oulu University (Finland). Among those we
studied the LBP (Local Binary Pattern) algorithm [45] and then we worked on the introduc-
tion of the LPQ [19] (Local Phase Quantization) and the BSIF [17] (Binarized Statistical Image
Features) algorithms in the field of FLD. The LBP were first employed for two-dimensional
textures analysis and excellent results were obtained due to his invariance with respect to
grey level, orientation and rotation. It extracts certain uniform patterns corresponding to mi-
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crofeatures in the image. The histogram of these uniform patterns occurrence is capable of
characterize the image as it combines structural (it identify structures like lines and borders)
and statistical (micro-structures distribution) approaches. The LPQ [56] is a blur insensitive
texture classification method that can be used successfully in Liveness Detection, because
it is able to represent all spectrum characteristics of the images in a very compact feature
representation. The use of this algorithm represents a step ahead with respect to others pre-
vious work in which a simple spectrum analysis showed some benefits but was not effective
enough to detect the fingerprint liveness. Therefore, the main reason of proposing this ap-
proach is to point out the spectrum differences between a “live” fingerprint and a “fake” one.
The BSIF [31] is a local image descriptor constructed by binarizing the responses to linear fil-
ters but, in contrast to previous binary descriptors, the filters are learnt from natural images
using Independent Component Analysis (ICA). The BSIF descriptor has two parameters: the
filter size and the number of features extracted. Our experiments proved that, with a suffi-
cient number of features, this algorithm clearly outperformed both LBP and LPQ.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that many algorithms have been proposed so far [32],
none of them showed the ability to clearly discriminate between real and fake fingertips.
The main problem is due to the difficulty of training appropriately a liveness detector, since
fake fingerprint images can derive from replicas made up of a wide spectrum of materials,
and it is practically impossible to cover this range; moreover, each algorithm has its own ra-
tionale. To the state-of-the-art, we can consider some liveness measurements based on the
live fingerprint characteristics, as the perspiration or the ridge-valley consistency. On the
other hand, other liveness measurements are based on the hypothesis that the fabrication
process leads to significant modifications, due to the elastic deformation of the replica, the
presence of artifacts, the loss of details. From this point of view, we tried to exploit these
basic differences by concatenating the feature vectors provided by each algorithm [18]. We
pointed out that current FLD algorithms cannot be adopted individually, but their combina-
tion, carefully handled, can help improving the performance, thus allowing their integration
in current fingerprint verification systems.
However the most important part of my research was the analysis of the extracted fea-
tures and what we called the “user specific” problem. As a matter of fact, as previously stated,
the FLD algorithms performances are not yet good enough and, in our opinion, one of the
reasons of such a low performance is due to a “user specific” component that reduces their
ability in discriminating between live and fake fingerprint images. We provided a model for
this “user specific” effect and we are the first to propose an approach to user specific FLD.
Until now that of the FLD has always been dealt with as a “general purpose” problem with a
certain amount of live and fake fingerprint images to be analyzed regardless of the users to
which they belonged. But our research suggests that some of the extracted features also re-
tain information related to the user as they describe the texture of that particular fingerprint.
We noticed indeed that the live and fake samples of the same user are closer between them
than to live and fake samples of other users. This user specific characteristic, with regard
to the liveness detection, is a bias that should be removed and we successfully did it further
improving the obtained results.
Since 2009, in order to assess the achievements of the state of the art in FLD, the De-
partment of Electrical and Electronic Engineering of the University of Cagliari, and the De-
partment of Electrical and Computer Engineering of the Clarkson University, have organized
three editions of the Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition (LivDet) [35, 59, 20]. The
goal of the competition is to compare software-based FLD methodologies, using a standard-
3ized testing protocol and large quantities of spoof and live fingerprint images. The partici-
pants have to provide an algorithm capable of processing each image and output a liveness
score normalized in the range between 0 and 100 (100 is the maximum degree of liveness, 0
means that the image is fake). In three different editions of the competition, eleven datasets
were created using different sensors thanks to hundreds of volunteers, whose fingerprints
were acquired several times. Some of those fingerprints were also “spoofed” with the coop-
erative or the non-cooperative method. In the cooperative method the volunteer pushes his
finger into a plasticine like material creating a negative impression of the fingerprint as a
mold. The mold is then filled with a material, such as gelatin, PlayDoh or silicone and the
fake fingertip is created. In the non-cooperative method a latent fingerprint left on a surface
is enhanced, is digitized through the use of a photograph, and finally the negative image is
printed on a transparency sheet. This printed image can then be made into a mold, for ex-
ample, by etching the image onto a printed circuit board which can be used to create the
spoof cast.
The First International Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition, LivDet 2009 [35],
provided an initial assessment of software systems. The second [59] and third [20] Liveness
Detection Competition were created in order to ascertain the current state of the art in live-
ness detection. Besides the work on the algorithms and the analysis of the extracted features,
I have been involved in the organization of both second and third editions of the competition
(LivDet2011 and LivDet2013) that were both open to all academic and industrial institutions
and I’m currently involved in the acquisition of live and fake fingerprints that will be inserted
in three of the LivDet 2015 datasets.
In the second chapter of this thesis the biometric systems, measures and vulnerability
are introduced paying particular attention to fingerprints. A general overview of Fingerprint
Liveness Detection methods and state-of-the-art is presented in chapter three. Textural al-
gorithms are dealt in chapter four together with the “user specific” problem. Experimental
results are shown in chapter five. Limitation and contributions of this work are described in
the sixth chapter.

Chapter 2
Biometric systems
Biometry allows to perform a person identification based on his physical (fingerprints, face,
iris) or behavioral (gait, signature) attributes and to establish an identity based on who you
are, rather than what you possess (e.g. a card that can be lost or stolen) or what you re-
member (e.g. a password that can be forgotten) [26]. Biometric measures were first used by
Alphonse Bertillon during the nineteenth century. He created a method for the convicts per-
sonal identification based on 11 measurements of different parts of the body such as head
size, height or expanse of the arms. When it became clear that those measures were non
unique, police departments and prisons in both the United States and Europe switched to
fingerprint identification. Since then we have seen a significant growth in biometric research
with the development of new sensors, novel feature extraction and many different matching
algorithms.
A biometric system is a pattern recognition system. Biometric data is acquired from a
person, a features set is extracted from the data, these features are compared against those
stored in the database and an action is executed based on the comparison result. It can be
schematized in having four main modules (see Figure 2.1):
• a sensor module (a biometric reader or scanner) required to acquire the raw biometric
data of an individual;
• a quality assessment and feature extraction module that assesses the quality of the bio-
metric data acquired by the sensor using, if necessary, a signal enhancement algorithm
and extracts a set of features;
• a matching module that compares the features with the stored templates to generate
match scores;
• a database module that is the repository of the biometric information saved during the
enrollment process.
The template of a user can be extracted from a single biometric sample or it can be gen-
erated by processing multiple samples. In order to account for the intra-class variations as-
sociated with a single user, some systems store multiple templates. A biometric system may
5
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Figure 2.1: Biometric system scheme.
function either in verification or identification mode. In the verification mode, the system
performs a one-to-one comparison to determine whether the identity is the one claimed by
the individual. It answers to the question “am I whom I claim I am?”. In the identification
mode, the system analyzes the templates of all the users in the database looking for a match
in order to establish a person identity. It answers to the question “who am I?”.
Some of the characteristic of a biometric system should be [26, 8]:
• Universality: each person is expected to have this biometric.
• Distinctiveness: the data collected from any two persons should be sufficiently differ-
ent.
• Permanence: over the time the biometric should be sufficiently invariant.
• Collectability: the biometric can be measured quantitatively.
However, there are other properties that should be considered in practice:
• Performance: the recognition of an individual is expected to be achieved with suffi-
cient accuracy and speed.
• Acceptability: an indicator of how much a biometric system is accepted by the people.
• Circumvention: it shows how easy (or difficult) it is to fool the system.
2.1 Biometric measures
There is a great number of biometric measures that can be divided into two main groups:
physiological and behavioral. Some of the principal biometrics are:
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• DNA: it is a code unique for every person except for identical twins that share the same
DNA. Its use is limited for different reasons: is easy to steal a piece of DNA from an un-
aware subject; a real-time recognition is impossible due to the long lasting matching
process; the privacy of an individual can be violated obtaining information like sus-
ceptibilities to certain diseases.
• Ear: the shape of the ear is distinctive although the features obtained are not unique.
It is based on the measurement of the distance between distinctive points.
• Face: it is the biometric that mankind has always used. The pro is that it is a non
intrusive method while the con is the difficulty in ignoring the effects of ageing, the
changes in facial expressions, the variations in the imaging environment and in the
pose of the face.
• Infrared thermogram: with an infrared camera it is possible to capture the heat radi-
ated by a body and it is possible to distinguish even identical twins. It is a non-invasive
technology but heat sources near the body may affect the acquisition.
• Gait: it is a measurement of the way a person walks but it is not very distinctive. More-
over, it may not be invariant during a period of time due to variations of weight, in-
juries, inebriety and mood.
• Hand and finger geometry: it uses features of the human hand, like size and length of
the fingers but it is not very distinctive.
• Iris: it is distinctive for each person and each eye and its recognition is extremely ac-
curate and fast. The iris image is captured with the cooperation of the user.
• Keystroke dynamics: it is a behavioral biometric based on the hypothesis that each
person types on a keyboard in a characteristic way. It is not unique and large variations
of patterns can be observed for some subjects.
• Odor: the odor of an object is characteristic of its chemical composition. An array
of chemical sensors can detect the odor emitted by a body that is distinctive of that
person.
• Retinal scan: it is considered one of the most secure biometric because the retinal vas-
culature is supposed to be different for each individual and each eye and it is difficult
to replicate. Unfortunately the high quality of the capture devices makes them very
expensive and it is required a great cooperation by the users.
• Signature: it is a behavioral biometric that has legal value even though it changes
through time and it is influenced by physical and emotional conditions.
• Voice: it is easy to obtain but is not distinctive enough because it can be influenced
by the physical and psychological condition of the subject and it can be imitated. If a
person must be recognized over the phone it is the only biometric measure that can be
used.
• Fingerprints: they are the most used, oldest and well-known biometric measurements.
Everybody has them and each one is different from the other. However, as recently
shown, they can be forged and that is the subject of this thesis.
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Figure 2.2: Different attacks to a biometric system.
• Palmprint: it is based on the observation of the ridges flow and the minutiae extraction
of the entire hand.
2.2 Vulnerability of biometric systems
There are no systems 100% secure. A biometric system can be subject to several kind of
threats [26]:
• Circumvention: the attacker gains access to protected resources.
• Covert acquisition (contamination): the attacker access the system using biometric
information taken from a legitimate user.
• Collusion and coercion: the attacker is a legitimate user that acts freely (collusion) or
under some kind of threat (coercion).
• Denial of service (DoS): the system performances are slowed down or stopped so that
the legitimate users are no longer able to access the system.
• Repudiation: the attacker, a corrupt user, denies accessing the system claiming that
his biometric data were stolen or faked.
According to Ratha et al. there are several kinds of attack of a biometric system [48] (see
Figure 2.2):
1. Presenting fake biometrics at the sensor: a reproduction (in our case a fake fingerprint)
is presented as input to the system.
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2. Resubmitting illegally intercepted data (replay): a signal is stored and then it is re-
played to access the system.
3. Overriding the feature extraction process: The feature extractor is attacked using a Tro-
jan horse, so that it produces feature sets preselected by the intruder.
4. Replacing legitimate features: The features extracted from the input signal are replaced
with a different feature set.
5. Corrupting the matcher: The matcher is attacked and corrupted so that it produces
preselected match scores.
6. Tampering with stored templates: if the attacker is able to modify a template in the
database, he could authorize a fraudulent individual or he could deny service to a le-
gitimate user.
7. Attacking the channel between the stored templates and the matcher: the data sent to
the matcher through a communication channel could be intercepted and modified.
8. Overriding the final decision: if an attacker is able to override the final match decision,
then the authentication system has been disabled.
2.3 Errors in a biometric system
The output of a biometric identification system is a matching score s (usually a value in the
range [0,1]) that is a measure of the similarity between the data received in input and a tem-
plate in a database. A value closest to 1 represents a highest similarity. Once a threshold t is
selected, if the score s is higher than t , then we have a match: the input data and the template
belong to the same subject. There are two kind of errors that can be made: a positive match
between sets of measures belonging to different persons, called false match and a negative
match between sets of measures belonging to the same person, called false rejection. An
evaluation of those errors is given by two measures:
• FAR (False Acceptance Rate): percentage of impostors accepted as genuine users. It is
the fraction of impostor scores that exceed the threshold t:
F AR(t )=
∫ 1
t
P (s|i mpostor )d s (2.1)
• FRR (False Rejection Rate): percentage of users rejected as impostors. It is the fraction
of genuine scores below the threshold t:
F RR(t )=
∫ t
0
P (s|g enui ne)d s (2.2)
As we vary the threshold t the value of both FAR and FRR varies: if t grows also the FRR
grows, while the FAR decreases and, conversely, if t decreases also the FRR decreases, while
the FAR grows (see Figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.3: False acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) as functions of the
threshold t.
There are other important values that we can consider:
• GAR (Genuine Acceptance Rate): it is the percentage of genuine users accepted by the
system. It is defined as:
G AR = 1−F RR (2.3)
• EER (Equal Error Rate): it is the point where F AR(t )= F RR(t ).
• HTER (Half Total Error Rate): it is defined as (F AR+F RR)/2.
• 1%FAR (1%FRR): It is the FRR (FAR) that correspond to the threshold for which the FAR
(FRR) is fixed to 1%.
• ZeroFAR (ZeroFRR): It is the FRR (FAR) that correspond to threshold for which the FAR
(FRR) is fixed to 0%.
The different values of FAR and FRR (or GAR), obtained at the variation of the threshold,
can be show with a curve called ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) (see Figure 2.4).
2.4 Fingerprints
Fingerprint ridges formation is a combination of factors both environmental and genetic
[27]. As a matter of fact, DNA gives general instructions on the skin formation in a fetus
but the specific way in which it happens it is a result of random events (and that is why
even the fingerprints of identical twins are different). There are so many variations during
the formation of a fingerprints that it would be impossible for two fingerprints to be exactly
alike (but this uniqueness has never been demonstrated).
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Figure 2.4: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC curve) and Equal Error Rate (EER).
2.4.1 A brief history
Fingerprints have been probably used since ancient times as a kind of signature but the first
study has been published in 1686 by Marcello Malpighi. He was an anatomy professor at
the University of Bologna who for the first time analyzed ridges, spirals and loops in finger-
prints. Fingerprints individuality was suggested in 1880 by Henry Fauld. In 1888 Sir Fran-
cis Galton introduced the use of the features called minutiae for fingerprint matching and
in 1899 Edward Henry devised a system of fingerprint classification. Since the beginning
of the twentieth century fingerprints were used for criminal identification and in the early
1960s, thanks to the development of computer processing, the AFIS (Automatic Fingerprint
Identification Systems) was created. Nowadays, thanks to less expensive devices and reli-
able matching algorithms, fingerprints are used not just in forensic applications but also for
personal identification.
2.4.2 Fingerprint structure
We asserted that fingerprints are unique but that uniqueness depends on the type and num-
ber of features extracted (basically less features means less details and therefore less infor-
mation obtained). Fingerprints are composed of epidermic ridges and valleys that usually
run in parallel. On the images obtained through sensors dark lines are the ridges while the
bright lines are the valleys. The extracted images details can be divided in three different lev-
els: on the first level the global pattern of the fingerprint is analyzed, on the second there are
the so called minutiae (such as ridge bifurcations and endings) and on the third level some
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Figure 2.5: Core and delta singular points in fingerprint images.
fingerprint micro-characteristics are analyzed such as pores and ridges contour.
First level features
The singular points and ridges flow are the features of this level. The singular points are the
centers of regions where the ridge orientation is erratic. There are two types of these points
(see Figure 2.5):
• Core: it is the center of a series of marked curves of ridges and valleys. It is frequently
considered the center of the fingerprint.
• Delta: it is the center of a kind of triangle described by three patterns.
Following Henry classification system and depending on the ridges flow, core and delta
positions, it is possible to distinguish five major pattern categories (see Figures 2.6 (a-e)):
1. Arch
2. Tented Arch
3. Right Loop
4. Left Loop
5. Whorl
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(a) leftLoop (b) rightLoop (c) whorl
(d) arch (e) tentedArch
Figure 2.6: Examples of the five major fingerprint categories.
Second level features
At a local level some ridges discontinuity called minutiae can be found. There are many dif-
ferent kind of minutiae but they can be divided in two main groups: termination (when a
ridge end) and bifurcation (when a ridge splits into two ridges). During a fingerprint fea-
tures extraction each minutia is usually described by his position with respect to a common
point of origin and some additional characteristic such as direction (of the ridge) or type (of
the minutia). The most popular and used fingerprint matching methods are based on the
matching of minutiae represented by the triplet (x, y,θ) where (x, y) is the minutia position
and θ is the orientation of the ridge in the point where the minutia is (see Figure 2.7).
Third level features
The third level features are the fingerprint micro-characteristic such as the pores. A pore is
formed when a sweat gland under the skin generates a sweat duct that reaches the surface
of the epidermis. Once these pores are formed on the ridge, they are fixed at that location. It
has been shown that pores do not disappear, neither move or spontaneously generate over
time [49]. In addition to the minutiae, pores can be used in the matching process because of
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Figure 2.7: Fingerprint minutiae: termination and bifurcation.
Figure 2.8: Pores in a fingerprint.
their unique configuration. In this thesis we analyze the number of pores of a fingerprint for
liveness detection purposes (see Figure 2.8).
2.4.3 Fingerprint scanners
Up to recently fingerprints were acquired with the ink-technique which is a process called
off-line. Another case of off-line acquisition is that of the latent fingerprints found in crime
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scenes. Nowadays, the acquisition is an on-line process executed by digital scanners. There
are several types of sensors and their collected images have different characteristics. The
main characteristics of the images obtained by a fingerprint scanner are [1]:
• Resolution: it indicates the number of dots or pixels per inch (dpi). The minimum
resolution for FBI-compliant scanners is 500 dpi.
• Area: it is the size of the fingerprint portion that can be acquired by the scanner. Ac-
cording to the FBI it should be at least 1x1 square inches.
• Number of pixels: it is the number of pixels in the fingerprint image.
• Dynamic range (or depth): it is the number of bits used to encode the intensity value
of each pixel. FBI standard requires a depth of 8 bit.
• Geometric accuracy: it is the geometric distortion introduced by the acquisition device
with respect to the x and y directions.
• Image quality: it is difficult to define and especially tell how much the level of this
quality depends on the image itself or on the intrinsic finger quality.
The fingerprint sensors can be:
• Optical sensors: the fingertip is illuminated by a bank of light-emitting diodes (LED)
and the light is absorbed at the ridges (that is why they appear dark) and reflected at
the valleys (which appear bright). The reflected image is focused onto a CCD or CMOS
image sensor and acquired [27]. There are several kind of internal mechanisms:
– Frustrated Total Internal Reflection (FTIR): when the finger touches the top side
of a glass prism there is a contact between the prism surface and the ridges while
the valleys remain distant. The light enters the prism, it is reflected, exits from
one side and it is focused through a lens onto the sensor.
– FTIR with a sheet prism: it uses a number of prisms instead of a single large one
and that is why the size is reduced (as a matter of fact the sheet prism is nearly
flat) but the quality of the images is generally lower than the one obtained with a
traditional FTIR.
– Optical fibers: the sensor size can be reduced if prism and lens are substituted
with a fiber-optic platen. The CCD/CMOS is in direct contact with the platen
therefore it is greater than the one in the FTIR and the cost of the device is higher.
– Electro-optical: it is a device constituted by two layers. In the first one there is a
light-emitting polymer; the potential across the surface is not the same because
the ridges touch the polymer while the valleys do not and the emitted light de-
pends on that potential. In the second layer there is a photodiode array that re-
ceive the light emitted and produce the digital image.
– Direct reading: the finger does not touch the surface of the device as it is equipped
with a mechanical support through which a fingertip picture is taken by an high-
quality camera. Obviously the surface does not require any cleaning but it is dif-
ficult to obtain well-focused and high-contrast images.
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• Solid-state sensors (silicon sensors): They are made up of an array of pixels, each pixel
being a tiny sensor itself. There are not lens, CCDs or CMOSs and the fingertip stand
directly on the silicone surface. Both Apple Iphone and Samsung Galaxy new mod-
els have solid state sensors. Depending on the way the information is converted into
electrical signals, four different kind of sensors can be distinguished:
– Capacitive: it is a two-dimensional array of micro-capacitor plates while the other
plate of each capacitor is the finger skin itself. Between the finger and the silicon
plate small charges are created. The charges magnitude depends on the distance
between the fingerprint and the plates and consequently it is different for ridges
and valleys.
– Thermal: it is made of pyro-electric material that generates current based on tem-
perature differential that varies from the ridges, in contact with the surface, to the
valleys. The contact produces the image that is acquired.
– Electric field: consists of a drive ring that generates a sinusoidal signal and a ma-
trix of active antennas that receives a very small amplitude signal modulated by
the subsurface of the skin. For that reason, it does not matter if fingertips are too
dry, too humid or even if they have little scars.
– Piezoelectric: a dielectric material on the surface generates a different amount
of electric current with the change applied by the finger pressure. Due to a dif-
ferent distance from the sensor surface, the current produced by the so called
piezoelectric effect is different for ridges and valleys.
• Ultrasound sensors: They are composed by a transmitter that generates acoustic sig-
nals sent toward the finger and by a receiver that detects the pulses bounced off the
fingerprint surface. In this way it is possible to compute a good quality image of the
subsurface of the skin. Despite the good quality obtained, this sensor is far too big and
expensive. Additionally, it takes a few seconds to acquire an image.
Chapter 3
Fingerprint liveness detection state
of the art
3.1 Introduction to fingerprint liveness detection
A spoof is a counterfeit biometric that is used in an attempt to circumvent a biometric sen-
sor. In the case of fingerprints, it can be an artificial finger or a dismembered finger. The
purpose of liveness detection is to distinguish “live” from “fake” biometric traits [26]. Live-
ness detection is based on the principle that additional information can be garnered above
and beyond the data procured by a standard verification system, and this additional data can
be used to verify if a biometric measure is authentic. The concept of spoofing has existed for
some time now. Research into spoofing began in 1998 from research conducted by D. Willis
and M. Lee where six different biometric fingerprint devices were tested against fake fingers
and it was found that four out of six were susceptible to spoofing attacks [58]. This research
was approached again in 2000-2002 by multiple institutions including Putte et al. [57] as well
as Matsumoto et al. [38]. The presented research looked at the vulnerability of spoofing. In
2002, Schuckers delved into using software approaches for liveness detection [50].
3.2 Fingerprint reproduction process
There are two general forms of creating artificial fingers, the cooperative method and the
non-cooperative method:
• Cooperative method: the subject pushes his or her finger into a malleable material
such as dental impression material, plastic, or silicon gum creating a negative impres-
sion of the fingerprint as a mold (see Figure 3.1 (a)). The mold is then filled with a
material, such as Gelatin, PlayDoh or Silicone. This cast is an almost perfect copy of a
live subject finger (see Figure 3.1 (b)).
• Non-cooperative method: it involves enhancing a latent fingerprint left on a surface,
digitizing it through the use of a photograph, and finally printing the negative image
on a transparency sheet. This printed image can then be made into a cast. Another
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way is to etch the image onto a printed circuit board and then drip material onto the
PCB to make the cast (see Figure 3.2).
(a) Mold (b) Fake fingertip
Figure 3.1: Mold that reproduce a negative impression of five fingerprints (a) and latex spoof
of a fingerprint (b).
3.3 Liveness detection methods
The challenge for a fingerprint recognition systems is the ability to detect if a presented fin-
gerprint has been acquired from a live person or an artificial finger. Systems are being up-
graded to incorporate liveness detection solutions that will be able to detect if the submitted
probe is a spoof or live finger [32, 52]. Following the taxonomy proposed by Coli et al. [11],
those detection methods are divided into two main categories: hardware based and software
based:
1. hardware based: liveness detection can be incorporated into a system through the ad-
dition of hardware components to the capture device that can search for traits in the
fingerprint using blood pressure, electrocardiogram, temperature or other methods.
2. Software based: liveness detection can also be implemented through the use of al-
gorithms that are added to the system. It is a less expensive approach because no
additional hardware is required. These methods extract features from the fingerprint
images in order to determine liveness and, according to the number of images exam-
ined, they are called dynamic (the features extracted derive from the analysis of mul-
tiple frames of the same fingerprint) or static (the features are extracted from a single
fingerprint impression or from the comparison of different impressions of the same
fingerprint). Another subdivision of the software based methods can be grounded on
the physical principle they exploit: the perspiration, the elastic distortion and the mor-
phology of the fingerprint.
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(a) latent fingerprint enhancement (b) fingerprint photo-
graph
(c) negative image (d) latex poured over the printed image.
Figure 3.2: Non-cooperative method.
3.4 Software-based methods state of the art
As previously stated, the software-based approaches to liveness detection does not require
additional hardware. We analyze the state of the art of dynamic and static methods.
3.4.1 Dynamic methods
During the contact between the finger and the scanner surface the skin gets wetter due to
the increasing amount of sweat. Since the pores on the fingertip surface are the source of
the perspiration process, Derakhshani et al. in [12] examined how they change in sequential
frames during a fixed interval of few seconds in both live and fake fingertips. The variation
of the wetness of the fingertip skin reflects on a variation of the gray-level profile of the ac-
quired images. In order to evaluate this feature, the fingerprint skeleton of the image at 0
and 5 seconds is converted into a couple of mono-dimensional signals. Several statistical
measures are proposed on the basis of the obtained signals such as the total swing ratio, the
Min/Max growth ratio, the last-first fingerprint signal difference mean and the percentage
change of standard deviation.
Parthasaradhi et al. [46] introduced some modifications. Since excessive amount of wet-
ness can produce a saturated signal, they added two new features: dry saturation percentage
change and wet saturation percentage change.
In [9] Coli et al. proposed two dynamic features: the time variation of the grey level mean
value of the whole image and the L1-distance of its grey levels histogram.
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In [28], Jia et al. introduced some new features extraction methods based on the analysis
of human skin elasticity. Once the fingertip is on the scanner surface, a sequence of finger-
print images which describes the finger deformation process is captured. Then two features
which represent the skin elasticity are extracted from the image sequence: 1) the correlation
coefficient between the fingerprint area and the signal intensity; 2) the standard deviation of
the fingerprint area extension in x and y axes. Finally the Fisher Linear Discriminant is used
to discriminate the real skin from artificial materials.
The work of Antonelli et Al. [3] adopted a dynamic procedure in order to perform a live-
ness detection based on elastic deformation. Once the finger is on the scanner surface, the
user is invited to rotate the fingertip. An elastic tension and, consequently, an elastic defor-
mation is caused by the movement of the fingertip on the surface. The deformation degree
depends on the level of elasticity of the skin that is supposed to be different for live or arti-
ficial fingers. A sequence of images is acquired at high frame rate and the elastic distortion
from each frame to the next one, is encoded in a features vector (“distortion code”).
Abhyankar e Schuckers in [1, 51], used the perspiration phenomenon, observed only in
live people, as a measure to classify “live” fingers from “not live” (fake or belonging to a ca-
daver) fingers. Multiresolution analysis and wavelet packet analysis are used to extract in-
formation from low frequency and high frequency content of the images respectively. The
images were acquired as soon as the finger was leaned on the sensor and then after 5 sec-
onds.
A method based on fingerprint deformation analysis was proposed by Zhang et al. [61].
The subject is required to put a finger on the sensor surface, and then apply some pressure in
four different directions. A thin-plate spline (TPS) is used to model the distortion of live and
spoof fingerprints. Since spoof materials are typically much more rigid, compared to the hu-
man skin, their deformation is lower. This deformation is represented by the displacement
of paired minutiae obtained before and after distortion.
3.4.2 Static methods
Tan e Schuckers in [53] developed a new method that quantify the perspiration phenomenon
in a single image. The underlying process is to extract the ridge signal which represents the
gray level values along the ridge mask and then use wavelet transform to decompose this sig-
nal into multi-scales. On each scale, static features are extracted to quantify the perspiration
pattern to distinguish between live and non-live fingerprints.
In another work [54], the above mentioned authors proposed a liveness detection method
based on noise analysis along the valleys in the ridge-valley structure of fingerprint images.
Statistical features are extracted in multiresolution scales using the wavelet decomposition
technique.
Several methods based on the analysis of a single image have been proposed by Nikam
and Agarwal. In [43, 43] they proposed a new method based on the ridgelet transform. As a
matter of fact, wavelets are very effective in representing objects with isolated point singular-
ities, but ridgelet transform allows representing singularities along lines in a more efficient
way than the wavelets. They use ridgelet energy and co-occurrence signatures to character-
ize the fingerprint texture.
These two authors also propose [44, 42] the use of curvelet transform for liveness de-
tection. Curvelet transform allows representing singularities along curves in a more effi-
cient way than the wavelets. Ridges oriented in different directions in a fingerprint image
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are curved, hence curvelets are very significant to characterize fingerprint texture. As for
ridgelet, the fingerprint texture is characterized by energy and co-occurrence signatures [4].
In [40], they also proposed the integrated use of Local Binary Pattern (LBP) and wavelet
transform. LBP histograms are used to capture the textural details while wavelet energy fea-
tures characterize ridge frequency and orientation information.
In [41] they used again textural measures based on wavelet energy signatures and Gray
Level Co-occurrence Matrix (GLCM) features. In this work, in order to extract textural char-
acteristics, they introduced some statistical measures defined by Haralick [23].
In all of these methods, proposed by Nikam and Agarwal, an algorithm is employed to
reduce the dimensionalities of the feature sets: PCA (Principal Component Analysis) or SFFS
(Sequential Forward Feature Selection). The results have been tested with three classifiers
and then fused with an hybrid classifier.
Since in a live finger it can be noticed the regular periodicity due to the pores on the
ridges while this regularity is not evident for spoof fingerprint signals, Derakhshani et al. [13]
used one static feature based on the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of the fingerprint skeleton
converted into a mono-dimensional signal.
In [55] Tan and Schuckers fused together their previous works [13, 53, 54] with a measure
of the image quality.
Moon et al. [39], looking at the finger surface with an high resolution camera, observed
that the surface of a fake finger is much coarser than that of a live finger. They employed
a 1000 dpi sensor, whilst current sensors exhibit 500 dpi on average, and they did not work
with the entire image (too large because of its resolution) but with subsamples of a fixed size.
For extracting this feature, the residual noise returned from a denoising process applied to
the original sub-images is considered. The standard deviation of this noise is then computed
to highlight the difference between live and fake coarseness.
Chen et al. [5] presented a static method that use multiple impressions and is based on
elastic-deformation features. Given a genuine query-template pair of fingerprints, the entity
of elastic distortion between the two sets of extracted minutiae is measured. The idea is that
live and spoof fingerprints show different elasticity response repeating the acquisitions.
Coli et al. [10] analyzed the frequency domain with a two-dimensional Fourier transform.
Some fingerprint micro-characteristics are less defined in an artificial fingerprint image due
to the roughness of the skin or to the ridge line discontinuity. Thereby, high frequency details
can be removed or strongly reduced. In order to measure that reduction they computed the
modulus of the Fourier transform of the image, called “Power Spectrum”. They defined the
HFE (High Frequency Energy) as the square module integral of the image Fourier transform
calculated outside a circular region with R as radius and centered on the null frequencies
along both axis. HFE measure can characterize the information which distinguish fake and
live fingerprints.
H.Choi et al. [7] introduced a liveness detection method based on multiple static fea-
tures, derived from a single fingerprint image. These features are individual pore spacing,
residual noise and several first order statistics. A correlation filter is adopted to address indi-
vidual pore spacing. The selected features are useful to reflect the physiological and statisti-
cal characteristics of live and fake fingerprint.
In [2] Abhyankar et al. proposed the use of a multiresolution texture analysis technique
to minimize the energy associated with phase and orientation maps. Cross ridge frequency
analysis of fingerprint images was performed by means of statistical measures and weighted
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mean phase was calculated. These different 36 features along with ridge reliability or ridge
center frequency were given as inputs to a fuzzy c-means classifier.
Tidu et al. [36] proposed two measures: the use of the number of pores and the mean
distance between them to discriminate live and fake. In addition, a third measure has been
proposed to introduce the image quality under the assumption that the pores number will
be higher in good quality images and lower in bad ones. It is also been made a dynamic
analysis comparing the number of pores and the mean distance between them in two images
acquired at 0 and 5 second.
In [33] Marasco and Sansone propose a novel solution based on static features derived
from visual textures of the image. These measures are obtained using signal processing
methods (individual pore spacing, residual noise of the fingerprint image), first order statis-
tics (energy, entropy, median, variance, skewness, kurtosis, coefficient of variation), intensity-
based features (gray level 1 ratio, gray level 2 ratio).
Another set of features is extracted by Galbally et al. [15]. They used several sources of in-
formation: angle information provided by the direction field, Gabor filters, which represent
another implementation of the direction angle, pixel intensity of the gray-scale image and
power spectrum. They also assess the fingerprint quality analyzing the image in a holistic
manner, or combining the quality from local non-overlapped blocks of the image.
Gottschlich et al. [21] propose a new invariant descriptor of fingerprint ridge texture
called Histograms of Invariant Gradients (HIG). They were inspired by invariant feature de-
scriptors such as the Histograms of Oriented Gradients (HOG) and the Scale Invariant Fea-
ture Transform (SIFT). This descriptor is designed to preserve robustness to variations in
gradient positions. Spoofed fingerprints are detected using multiple histograms of invariant
gradients computed from spatial neighborhoods within the fingerprint.
3.4.3 Textural algorithms in Fingerprint Liveness Detection
Since the publication of Nikam and Agarwa work [40] it was evident the ability of the LBP
algorithm to capture the different characteristics of live and fake fingerprints. After that the
use of many other textural algorithms was introduced in the FLD field.
Ghiani et al. [19] proposed the use of a rotation invariant extension of the Local Phase
Quantization (LPQ). The LPQ is a blur insensitive texture classification method that works
at low frequency values in the frequency domain. Its blur invariance is probably the reason
of its ability to distinguish between live and fake samples. The obtained results, competitive
with the state-of-the-art, where further improved by a feature level fusion with the LBP.
In [22], Gragnaniello et al. used the Weber Local Descriptor (WLD), it consists of two
components (the differential excitation and the orientation) and depends not only on the
change of a stimulus such as lighting, but also on the original intensity of that stimulus. The
better performances were obtained with the combination of the WLD with the LPQ.
In 2013, Ghiani et al. [17] introduced the use of the Binarized Statistical Image Features
(BSIF). It is a local image descriptor constructed by binarizing the responses to linear filters
but, in contrast to other binary descriptors, the filters are learnt from natural images using
independent component analysis (ICA). A quantization-based representation encodes the
local fingerprint texture on a feature vector in a highly effective way.
Jia et al. [30] used a novel fingerprint vitality detection method based on Multi-Scale
Block Local Ternary Patterns (MBLTP). Instead of a single pixel, The computation is not
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based on a single pixel value but on the average value of blocks. The ternary pattern is
adopted to reflect the differences between the pixels and a selected threshold.
Again Jia et al. [29] proposed a spoof fingerprint detection method based on two different
types of Multi-Scale Local Binary Pattern (MSLBP). In the first type they simply increased the
radius of the LBP operator, in the second one they applied a set of filters to the image and
then they applied the LBP operator in the fixed radius. Both types of MSLBP, with proper
scales selection, outperformed many of the spoof fingerprint detection methods.
3.5 Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition
The Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering of the University of Cagliari and
the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering of the Clarkson University organize
the Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition (LivDet). The first edition was held in 2009
[35] and other two took place in 2011 [59] and 2013 [20]. The fourth edition will be hosted
in September by BTAS 2015. The competition purpose is to assess the achievements of the
state of the art in FLD and it is open to academic and industrial institutions. Once a signed
consent form is obtained, each user has access to a link for downloading the training set of
several datasets (three in 2009 and four in the following editions) is given. Each participant
gives their preference on whether to enter as anonymous.
3.5.1 Experimental protocol and evaluation
Due to the wide variety of current liveness detection algorithms, the competition defines
some constraints for the submitted algorithms:
1. Methods must output, for each image, a “liveness degree” ranging from 0 to 100 (e.g.
posterior probability of “true” class).
2. A training set of fake and live fingerprint images will be made available to each partici-
pant, freely downloadable from the LivDet site after the participant registration. These
images are a subset (25% in 2009 and a half in the following editions) of the entire data
set.
3. Each submitted algorithm, as a Win32 console application, must follow the input and
output sequence required.
4. Each submitted algorithm is tested using a withheld dataset that is the remaining part
(75% in 2009 and a half in the following editions) of the entire data set.
Each submitted algorithm should have the following list of parameters: LIVENESS_XYZ.exe
[ndataset] [inputfile] [outputfile] Where:
• LIVENESS_XYZ.exe is the executable name, where XYZ is the identification number of
the participant.
• [ndataset] is the identification number of the data set to analyse (it changes for each
edition depending on the dataset).
• [inputfile] is a text file with the List of images to analyse.
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• [outputfile] is a text file with the output of each processed image, in the same order of
[inputfile]. Given the image, the output is a posterior probability of the live class or a
degree of “liveness” normalized in the range 0 and 100 (100 is the maximum degree of
liveness, 0 means that the image is fake). In the case that the algorithm has not been
able to process the image, the correspondent output must be -1000 (failure to enroll).
Each parameter, related to the data set configuration, must be set before submission.
Each user can configure his algorithm by the training set available after registration. Only
Win32 console applications with the above characteristics will be accepted for the competi-
tion. Participants may also publish the source code of their algorithm, but this is not manda-
tory.
The following parameters are adopted for the performance evaluation:
• Frej: Rate of failure to enroll.
• Fcorrlive: Rate of correctly classified live fingerprints.
• Fcorrfake: Rate of correctly classified fake fingerprints.
• Ferrlive: Rate of misclassified live fingerprints.
• Ferrfake: Rate of misclassified fake fingerprints.
The threshold value for determining liveness was set at 50. This threshold is used for the
values given for Ferrfake and FerrLive.
3.5.2 Datasets
The 2009 dataset for the final evaluation is constituted of three sub-sets, which contain live
and fake fingerprint images from three different optical sensors. Table 3.1 lists the scanners
we used for data collection and table 3.2 the databases characteristics.
Images have been collected by a consensual approach using different materials for the
artificial reproduction of the fingerprint (gelatin, silicone, play-doh). The training sets con-
tain the 25% of the data, the remaining 75% is in the testing sets.
Data set Sensor Model No. Resolution(dpi) Image size
#1 Crossmatch Verifier 300 LC 500 480x640
#2 Identix DFR2100 686 720x720
#3 Biometrika FX2000 569 312x372
Table 3.1: Device characteristics of the LivDet 2009 datasets.
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Data set Sensor Live samples Fake samples
#1 Crossmatch 2000 2000
#2 Identix 1500 1500
#3 Biometrika 2000 2000
Table 3.2: Characteristics of the LivDet 2009 datasets (live/fake number of fingers).
The 2011 dataset for the final evaluation is constituted of four sub-sets, which contain live
and fake fingerprint images from four different optical sensors. Table 3.3 lists the scanners
used for data collection and table 3.4 the databases characteristics.
The dataset consists of images from four different devices; Biometrika, Digital Persona,
Italdata and Sagem. There are 4000 images for each of these devices, 2000 live images and
2000 spoof images (400 of each of 5 spoof materials). The spoof materials were gelatine,
latex, PlayDoh, silicone and wood glue for Digital Persona and Sagem (400 each) and gela-
tine, latex, ecoflex (platinum-catalysed silicone), silicone and wood glue for Biometrika and
ItalData (400,each). The dataset of 4000 images per scanner were divided into two equal
datasets, training and testing. Live images came from 400 fingers from 50 people for Biometrika
and ItalData datasets, 200 fingers representing 100 people for, Digital Persona dataset, and
112 fingers from 56 people for Sagem dataset. Spoof images come from approximately 100
fingers representing 50 people for the Digital Persona and Sagem Datasets and 81 fingers
representing 22 subjects for the Biometrika and ItalData datasets. The spoof images were
collected using the consensual method that was described earlier.
Data set Sensor Model No. Resolution(dpi) Image size
#1 Biometrika FX2000 500 315x372
#2 Digital Persona 4000B 500 355x391
#3 ItalData ET10 500 640x480
#4 Sagem MSO300 500 352x384
Table 3.3: Device characteristics of the LivDet 2011 datasets.
The 2013 datasets consists of images from four different devices; Biometrika, Crossmatch,
Italdata and Swipe. There are 4000 or more images for each of these devices as detailed in
tables 3.5 and 3.6. The spoof materials used for this experiment were Body Double, latex,
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Data set Sensor Live samples Fake samples
#1 Biometrika 2000 2000
#2 Digital Persona 2000 2000
#3 ItalData 2000 2000
#4 Sagem 2000 2000
Table 3.4: Characteristics of the LivDet 2011 datasets (live/fake number of fingers).
PlayDoh and wood glue for Crossmatch and Swipe and gelatine, latex, ecoflex (platinum-
catalysed silicone), modasil and wood glue for Biometrika and Italdata. The images were di-
vided into two equal datasets, training and testing. Live images came from 300 fingers from
50 subjects for the Biometrika and Italdata datasets, 940 fingers representing 94 subjects for
the Crossmatch dataset, and 1000 fingers from 100 subjects for the Swipe dataset.
Spoof images come from approximately 225 fingers representing 45 people for the Cross-
match and Swipe Datasets and 100 fingers representing 15 subjects for the Biometrika and
Italdata datasets. The spoof images of two of the LivDet 2013 datasets (Crossmatch and
Swipe) were collected using the cooperative method that was described earlier. The other
two datasets (Biometrika and Italdata) were created using the non-cooperative method (la-
tent fingerprints). This is the reason of the great difference between the error rates: a fake
created from a latent fingerprint will be, in many cases, less similar to the original one then
the one created with cooperation.
Data set Sensor Model No. Resolution(dpi) Image size
#1 Biometrika FX2000 569 315x372
#2 Italdata ET10 500 640x480
#3 Crossmatch L SCAN GUARDIAN 500 800x750
#4 Swipe 96 208x1500
Table 3.5: Device characteristics of the LivDet 2013 datasets.
In each one of three edition, at the end of the competition, the entire dataset has been
made available to the scientific community after the signing of an appropriate license agree-
ment.
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Data set Sensor Live samples Fake samples
#1 Biometrika 2000 2000
#2 Italdata 2000 2000
#3 Crossmatch 2250 2250
#4 Swipe 2250 2250
Table 3.6: Characteristics of the LivDet 2013 datasets (live/fake number of fingers).

Chapter 4
Textural features for fingerprint
liveness detection
Many popular local descriptors can be seen as statistics of labels computed in the local
pixel neighborhoods through filtering and quantization. These methods describe each pix-
els neighborhood by a binary code which is obtained by initially convolving the image with
a set of linear filters and then binarizing the filter responses. The bits in the code string
correspond to the binarized responses of the different filters. In different computer vision
problems these methods showed very good results. In contrast to global descriptors which
compute features directly from the entire image, local descriptors represent the features in
small local image patches. As already stated in the previous chapter, local descriptors and,
especially, textural algorithms provided excellent performance in the FLD field. In this thesis
we present the results obtained with the LBP, LPQ and BSIF algorithms.
4.1 Investigated methods
4.1.1 Multiresolution LBP
The LBP operator was first employed for two-dimensional textures analysis and excellent
results were obtained by the version invariant with respect to grey level, orientation and ro-
tation [45]. It extracts certain uniform patterns corresponding to microfeatures in the image.
The histogram of these uniform patterns occurrence is capable of characterize the image as
it combines structural (it identifies structures like lines and borders) and statistical (micro-
structures distribution) approaches.
In a circular neighborhood of each pixel of a grayscale image we define the texture T as:
T = t (gc , g0, ..., gP−1) (4.1)
This represents the distribution of the P surrounding pixels. gc is the grayscale value of
the selected pixel and gp are the pixels in the circular neighborhood of a given radius R with
R > 0. If gc is in position (0;0), then the P points gp , with p = 0, ...,P − 1, are in position
(−Rsi n(2pip/P );Rcos(2pip/P )).
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Figure 4.1: Examples of the points selected at different values of the position P and the radius
R [45].
The interpolation is used in order to estimate the values of those points that are not pre-
cisely in the center of a pixel. Figure 4.1 shows examples of the points selected at different
values of the position P and the radius R.
If we subtract the central value from the circular neighborhood values we obtain:
T = t (gc , g0− gc , g1− gc , ..., gP−1− gc ) (4.2)
Assuming that gp − gc values are independent from gc :
T ≈ t (gc )t (g0− gc , g1− gc , ..., gP−1− gc ) (4.3)
Since t (gc ) in 4.3 describes the overall luminance of the image, unrelated to local image
texture, much of the information is contained in:
T ≈ t (g0− gc , g1− gc , ..., gP−1− gc ) (4.4)
If we consider the signs of the differences instead of their exact values then invariance
with respect to the gray levels scaling is achieved:
T ≈ t (s(g0− gc ), s(g1− gc ), ..., s(gP−1− gc )) (4.5)
with:
s(x)=
{
1, x ≥ 0
0, x < 0 (4.6)
A unique LBPP,R value can be obtained by assigning the factor 2p for each sign s(gp −gc )
resulting in 2p different binary patterns:
LBPP,R =
P−1∑
p=0
s(gp − gc )2p (4.7)
In order to achieve rotation invariance namely to assign a unique identifier to each rota-
tion invariant local binary pattern we define:
LBP r iP,R =mi n{ROR(LBPP,R,i ) | i = 0,1, ...,P −1} (4.8)
ROR(x, i ) rotates the neighbor set clockwise so many times that a maximal number of
the most significant bits, starting from gP−1, is 0.
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The number U of spatial transitions (bitwise 0/1 changes) in the neighborhood pixels
sequence is a measure of uniformity. Patterns that have a U value of at most 2 are defined
“uniform” and the following operator is used:
LBP r i u2P,R =
{∑P−1
p=0 s(gp − gc ) i f U (LBPP,R )≤ 2
P +1 other wi se (4.9)
were:
U (LBPP,R )= |s(gP−1− gc )− s(g0− gc )|+
P−1∑
p=1
|s(gp − gc )− s(gp−1− gc )| (4.10)
The LBP r i u2P,R output values are P +2 instead of the 2p obtained with the LBPP,R . These
values, extracted for each pixel of the image, are inserted in an histogram that is used as a
feature vector.
In our experiment we will use the rotation invariant version with three different combi-
nation of the (P,R) values: (8,1), (16,2) and (24,3). The three histograms are then united in a
single feature vector of 10+18+26= 54 values.
4.1.2 Rotation Invariant LPQ
The Local Phase Quantization (LPQ) is a blur insensitive texture classification method [24].
It is able to represent all spectrum characteristics of images in a very compact feature repre-
sentation, thus avoiding redundant or blurred information. The main reason of proposing
this approach is to point out the spectrum differences between a “live” fingerprint and a
“fake” one. Since different fingerprint orientations may arise on a sensor surface, we adopt
the rotation invariant extension of LPQ.
Image blurring g (x) can be expressed by a 2-D convolution between the original image
f (x) and the point spread function (PSF) of the blur h(x), where the vector x represents the
coordinates (x, y). In the frequency domain, the convolution become the product: G(u) =
F (u)·H(u), where u is the frequency and G(u), F (u), and H(u) are discrete Fourier transforms
(DFT). If we just consider the phase of the spectrum, we obtain the sum: ∠G =∠F +∠H .
If the PSF is centrally symmetric, ∠H ∈ {0,pi} as the Fourier transform H is always real
and, usually, its shape is close to a Gaussian or a sinc function, hence H is positive at low
frequency values. In that frequency interval, ∠H = 0 and ∠G =∠F proving that the phase is
blur invariant.
For every pixel x, we compute the local spectra using a short term Fourier transform
(STFT) in the local neighborhood Nx (defined by a rectangular window function ωR ), ob-
taining:
F (u,x)=∑
y
f (y)ωR (y−x)e− j 2piu
T y (4.11)
That is a blur-insensitive representation, with four low frequency components: u1 =
[a,0]T , u2 = [0, a]T , u3 = [a, a]T , u4 = [a,−a]T , only if a is small enough to satisfy H(ui )> 0.
For each point x we can write:
F(x)= [F (u1,x),F (u2,x),F (u3,x),F (u4,x)] (4.12)
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Given the vector G(x)= [Re{F(x)}, Im{F(x)}], from his j -th component g j :
q j =
{
1, if g j ≥ 0
0, otherwise
(4.13)
We can write these eight binary coefficients in the form of an integer value included be-
tween 0 and 255 through:
FLPQ (x)=
8∑
j=1
q j 2
j−1
From all of these values (one for every pixel of the image), we obtain an histogram that
can be represented as a 256 features vector.
In the rotation invariant version of LPQ we take advantage of the fact that, given a ro-
tation matrix Rθ, the Fourier transform of a rotated function is the Fourier transform of the
original function rotated by Rθ. Instead of a rectangular window, we use a circular Gaussian
one and the coefficients of the local spectra 4.11 on a radius r around the point x′ =Rθx are
calculated at frequencies vi = r [cos(φi )si n(φi )]T , with φi = 2pii /M and i = 0, ..., M −1.
From the vector V (x) = [F (v0,x), ...,F (vM−1,x)], we calculate C(x) = Im{V (x)} and then
we extract the characteristic orientation ξ(x)=∠b(x) from the complex moment:
b(x)=
M−1∑
i=0
ci e
jϕi (4.14)
Instead of 4.12, we use the oriented frequency coefficients:
Fξ(u,x)=
∑
y
f (y)ωR (R
−1
ξ(x)(y−x))e− j 2piu
T R−1
ξ(x)y
If we apply a rotation, the position of the coefficients changes, but the 256-value his-
togram is the same (rotation invariant LPQ).
4.1.3 BSIF
Local image descriptors make the backbone of the current approaches for visual object recog-
nition. The function of descriptors is to convert the pixel-level information into a useful
form, which captures the most important image and video contents but is insensitive to ir-
relevant aspects caused by varying environment. In contrast to global descriptors which
compute features directly from the entire image, local descriptors, which have proved to be
more effective in real world conditions, represent the features in small local image patches.
Many popular local descriptors such as LBP [45] and LPQ [24] can be seen as statistics of
labels computed in the local pixel neighborhoods through filtering and quantization. These
methods describe each pixel’s neighborhood by a binary code which is obtained by first con-
volving the image with a manually predefined set of linear filters and then binarizing the
filter responses. The bits in the code string correspond to binarized responses of different
filters. These methods showed very good results in different computer vision problems [47].
For efficiently representing fingerprint images for liveness detection, we adopt a new lo-
cal descriptor called BSIF (binarized Statisitcal Image features) which was recently proposed
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Figure 4.2: Learnt filters of size 7×7.
by Kannala and Rahtu for face recognition and texture classification [31]. Inspired by LBP
and LPQ, the idea behind BSIF is to automatically learn a fixed set of filters from a small set of
natural images, instead of using hand-crafted filters such as in LBP and LPQ. Our proposed
approach for fingerprint representation consists of apply learning, instead of manual tun-
ing, to obtain statistically meaningful representation of the fingerprint data, which enables
efficient information encoding using simple element-wise quantization. Learning provides
also an easy and flexible way to adjust the descriptor length and to adapt to applications with
unusual image characteristics such as fingerprints.
To characterize the texture properties within each fingerprint sub-region, the histograms
of pixel’s BSIF code values are then used. The value of each element (i.e. bit) in the BSIF
binary code string is computed by binarizing the response of a linear filter with a threshold
at zero. Each bit is associated with a different filter and the desired length of the bit string
determines the number of filters used. The set of filters is learnt from a training set of natural
image patches by maximizing the statistical independence of the filter responses [25]. The
details for computing the filters can be found in [31]. The set of the natural images that are
used in the calculation of the filters are shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: The set of the natural images that are used in the calculation of the BSIF filters.
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Given an image patch X of size l× l pixels and a linear filter Wi of the same size, the filter
response si is obtained by:
si =
∑
u,v
Wi (u, v)X (u, v)=w Ti x,
where vectors w and x contain the pixels of Wi and X .
The binarized feature bi is obtained by setting bi = 1 if si > 0 and bi = 0 otherwise.
The filters Wi are learnt using independent component analysis (ICA) by maximizing the
statistical independence of si .
To sum up:
• a certain number of “templates” in the spatial frequency space is set, let’s say n. These
templates correspond to filters previously computed. In the case of LPQ, these fil-
ters are computed over four pre-defined frequency values; in the case of BSIF, they
are learnt by ICA from a set of natural images. Size and number of filters may vary de-
pending on how many textural details must be pointed out in the image to be coded by
BSIF. In other words, input to ICA is the set of natural images, and the related output
is the set of filters (corresponding to the independent components generating those
images).
• A fingerprint image X is subdivided in patches, whose size corresponds to that of
adopted filters. For each patch, the set of filters is applied and each response is bi-
narized. At the end of this step, each patch is coded into a string of bits whose size is
equal to the bit length n. This string embeds the main textural characteristics of the
related patch (for example, in the case of three bits/filters, the code 010 means that the
patch is positively correlated with the second filter).
• At this point, a unique bit string is associated to each patch. Different patches may
share the same string. The final step is to compute the frequency of all possible config-
urations of n bits over all patches, thus obtaining the BSIF feature vector whose length
is 2n . The value of j -th component of such feature vector is the number of occurrences
of the related binary string corresponding to the decimal value j −1. This is also the
reason for which we referred to those feature vectors as “histograms”.
In our experiments, we used the set of filters provided by the authors of [31] and learnt
from the set of 13 natural images previously shown. There are two parameters in the BSIF
descriptor: the filter size l and the length n of the bit string. The filters Wi were learnt us-
ing different choices of parameter values, each set of filters was learnt using 50000 image
patches. The filters obtained with l = 7, n = 8 are illustrated in Figure 4.2.
4.1.4 Multi-Scale BSIF
One of the unsolved problems in the use of BSIF is the setting of the parameters, namely the
filters number (bit number) and their size (window size). Regarding the number of filters, a
rule of thumb is the more is the better, but there is the problem of the feature vector size. In
our experiments we have never used more than 12 filters of a given window size resulting in
a 4096 elements feature vector. Although previous work [17] indicates that, in the FLD case,
a higher accuracy has usually produced through filters of a relatively small size, this is not
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always true. Furthermore, since the performance produced by filters of different sizes do
not vary much, our hypothesis is that filters of different sizes actually capture different live
and fake characteristics. Therefore the features generated by filters of different size would
be, at least partially, complementary. In addition to the accuracy that we will show in the
experimental results, one of the key points of the BSIF is the filters speed in the features ex-
traction. Parallel computation based on the use of multiple windows could further improve
the performances.
For these reasons it is possible to apply filters of different dimensions and use different
fusion techniques both at a features and at a score level. In this thesis we simply fuse together
the feature vectors extracted with the BSIF using 12 bits and all the odd windows size from
5x5 to 17x17. Before the fusion, in order to reduce the high dimensionality of the feature
vector, we performed a feature reduction with the PCA (Principal Component Analysis) [14].
The PCA is performed on a matrix containing all the extracted feature vectors. The columns
of the new matrix are sorted in order of decreasing eigenvalues. The cumulative energy con-
tent of the first c columns is the sum of the first c eigenvalues:
Ener g y(c)=
c∑
i=1
ei g [i ] (4.15)
In our experiments we reduced the features using the 90%, 95% and 99% of the cumula-
tive energy content. In the next chapter we will show the obtained experimental results.
4.2 Textural characteristics of a fingerprint
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Figure 4.4: ROI of a live fingerprint (a) and corresponding fake (e). Histograms of the features
extracted with LPQ, LBP and BSIF from the ROI of the live fingerprint (b,c,d) and from the
ROI of the corresponding latex fake (f,g,h).
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Figure 4.5: ROI of a live fingerprint (a) and corresponding fake (e). Histograms of the features
extracted with LPQ, LBP and BSIF from the ROI of the live fingerprint (b,c,d) and from the
ROI of the corresponding wood glue fake (f,g,h).
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Figure 4.6: ROI of a live fingerprint (a) and corresponding fake (e). Histograms of the features
extracted with LPQ, LBP and BSIF from the ROI of the live fingerprint (b,c,d) and from the
ROI of the corresponding gelatine fake (f,g,h).
The comparison between the histograms obtained with different algorithms from images
of real and fake samples of the same fingerprint can help to better understand their function-
ing. As shown in figures 4.4-4.6 (a) and (e), we only considered as a ROI (Region Of Interest)
a square constructed around the core of the fingerprints. The histograms in figures 4.4-4.6
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(b,f), (c,g) and (d,h) are extracted respectively with the LPQ (256 values), LBP (54 values) and
BSIF with 6 bits and 5x5 filters (64 values).
It can be observed, from the feature vector values, that all the algorithms are able to cap-
ture some invariant characteristics of the fingerprint shape. An example is the three peaks
of all the LBP histograms. In particular, the peak on the fifth bin indicates a large number of
the textural templates corresponding to an edge, that is, the textural template correspond-
ing to the fifth value of the LBP feature vector. The distribution of other peaks clearly shows
common characteristics among fingerprints, which are captured by the LBP descriptor. Un-
fortunately it is not easy to point out features which establish the difference between live
and fake images (figures 4.4-4.6(c) and 4.4-4.6(g)), but what reported testifies that LBP is a
good fingerprint descriptor. Similar results are obtained by the BSIF (figures 4.4-4.6(d) and
4.4-4.6(h)). On the other hand, LPQ-based live and fake feature vectors are strongly differ-
ent, but we can also see a notable intra-class difference among feature vector values (figures
4.4-4.6(b) and 4.4-4.6(f)). It is almost impossible to identify specific characteristics captured
by LPQ, since the distributions of the frequency of textural templates appear as completely
random. However, its high performance shows that the LPQ feature space separates well live
and fake patterns by the phase changes at low frequencies.
These examples also suggest the presence of common characteristic between different
samples of the same finger, no matter if real or fake. The presence of this information, not
related to the fact that the fingerprint is true or fake, could be considered a sort of noise in
FLD. In the next section we will further analyze what we will call the “user-specific” problem.
4.3 The “User-Specific” problem
The feature set aimed at liveness detection is supposed to be able to measure the differ-
ences among “live” and “fake” fingerprint independently on the set of users at hand and,
obviously, on the one who will be eventually targeted by potential attackers. Therefore, in-
trinsic characteristics of the users’ fingerprint should be avoided by these measurements, in
order to avoid poor sampling representation and “polarized” classification. On the basis of
this hypothesis, the problem is expressed by a bayesian network where the state of nature
is two-classes (l i ve/ f ake or l i ve/l i ve), and the measurement, usually a feature vector, is
generated from this state. The module is therefore managed individually. This aspect im-
pacts on the design phase: the fingerprint liveness detector is designed to obtain a certain
performance independent on the so-called user population targeted by the fingerprint ver-
ification system. It should guarantee, for instance, the same “ROC curve” on very different
user populations. This “generic-user” approach can be reasonable when the system must be
used alone (for example in forensic applications or border checks), where it is supposed to
reveal a fraud trial, if any. On the other hand, when integrated in a fingerprint verification
system, the liveness detector should protect the system from very peculiar attacks, against
the targeted clients stored in the system’s memory. Therefore, in this case, the system should
be equipped with a “user-specific” fingerprint liveness detector. This view has been already
pointed out in two recent works [6, 60] dealing with face liveness detection. In particular, the
authors proposed several declinations of such a system: a generative approach in which live
and fake samples are represented as user-driven clusters; a discriminative approach when
live and fake samples of the targeted client are used to train one or more classifiers, and a
domain adaption approach when some fake samples of a certain user are missed.
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Starting from above previous works and observations, we will show that the user-specific
information may help improving the performance of a fingerprint liveness detector. For this
purpose, we will adopt three state-of-the-art feature sets (LBP [45], LPQ [56] and BSIF [31])
and two classifiers [14] (KNN with K = 1 and linear SVM) in order to show and explain this
phenomenon. We don’t have the ambition to state that user-specific is an intrinsic “char-
acteristic” of all possible features sets but only to show that in the observed cases this phe-
nomenon exists and can be exploited.
In the next chapter we will show evidences of this “user-specific effect” presence and we
will also take advantage of this effect in order to improve the accuracy of a FLD system.
Chapter 5
Experimental Results
5.1 Data sets
All the presented algorithms were tested using the data sets collected for the three editions of
the International Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition (LivDet 2009, 2011 and 2013).
In 2009 the data sets were collected by three optical sensors (Biometrika, Crossmatch and
Identix) [35], in 2011 by four optical sensors (Biometrika, Italdata, Digital Persona, Sagem)
[59] and in 2013 by two optical sensors (Biometrika and Italdata) and by a capacitive sensor
(Swipe) [20]. Each dataset is divided into two parts, one used to train a classifier and the
other to test the classifier performances (see Fig. 5.1). Device and datasets characteristics
were previously shown in Chapter 3. The overall number of analyzed live and fake fingerprint
images is 40,000.
Almost all of the fakes were created using a consensual method: a volunteer put his fin-
ger on a mould of plasticine like material and afterwards another material such as gelatine
or liquid silicon is poured over the mould. The result, after a certain time interval, is an ar-
tificial replica of the fingertip. The only exception was the Biometrika and Italdata images
of the LivDet 2013 data sets that were obtained acquiring fakes created with a non consen-
sual method: a latent fingerprint left on a surface is enhanced, digitized through the use of
a camera, and, finally, the negative image is printed on a transparency sheet, over which the
fake material is poured.
5.2 Experimental protocol
As stated in the previous chapter, we identified a “user-specific effect” presence. In order to
improve the accuracy taking advantage of this effect we had to adopt a different experimental
protocol with respect to the one usually adopted in FLD. For this reason, hereinafter, will
distinguish the latter case, that we will call “General-Purpose”, from the former, namely the
“user-specific” case, which will be discussed in a separate section.
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Figure 5.1: Classification of a fingerprint in a liveness detection system.
5.2.1 The “General-Purpose” case
For the BSIF algorithm, we used 60 different sets of learnt filters for all possible combina-
tions of window size (odd pixel squares from 3x3 to 17x17) and number of bits (from 5 to 12).
The only exception is the 3x3 window for which the number of bits ranges from 5 to 8. As a
matter of fact, the space of 3x3 patches is 9 dimensional, but discarding the constant ("DC")
component (discovered by ICA) leaves 8 dimensions, and hence there are eight filters repre-
senting the independent components. The spaces of larger patches are higher dimensional
and more independent components can be found. Due to space limitations and to the fact
that a greater number of filters prove to produce better results, in tables we will only show
results obtained with a bit number equal to 12. Therefore all the feature vectors will contain
212 = 4096 values. Both LBP and LPQ have been optimized in performance with respect to
data sets adopted, thus their performance is fairly comparable with that of BSIF. The LBP
feature vector contain 54 values while the LPQ one contains 256 values.
In order to compare our results with the state-of-the-art, we also reported those pre-
sented in [29], [22], [15] and [34].
The classifier adopted in all our tests (with BSIF, LBP and LPQ) was a linear Support Vec-
tor Machine1. The output of each SVM, a real value included in the [0,1] interval, is inter-
preted as a posteriori probability of the “Live" class given the input pattern. By thresholding
this value we are able to obtain the performance at different operational points. In particular,
we computed:
• Ferrlive: the rate of misclassified live fingerprints.
• Ferrfake: the rate of misclassified fake fingerprints.
• The Average Classification Error (ACE) which is defined as:
AC E = (Fer r l i ve+Fer r f ake)/2.
The threshold value for determining liveness was set at 0.5.
1This classifier gave the best results for all investigated feature vectors, including LBP and LPQ and other
textural-based algorithms, as also reported in [18, 19, 16]. Moreover, by tuning the classifier, the performance
difference among methods are substantially unaltered, thus we reported results only for the linear SVM classi-
fier.
5.3. “GENERAL-PURPOSE” EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 41
5.3 “General-Purpose” experimental results
100 101 102
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
False Positive Rate
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
Average ROC curves
 
 
LPQ
LBP
BSIF (5x5w, 12b)
(a)
100 101 102
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
False Positive Rate
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
Average ROC curves
 
 
BSIF (win 5x5)
BSIF (win 7x7)
BSIF (win 9x9)
BSIF (win 11x11)
BSIF (win 13x13)
BSIF (win 15x15)
BSIF (win 17x17)
(b)
100 101 102
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
False Positive Rate
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
Average ROC curves
 
 
BSIF (5 bits)
BSIF (6 bits)
BSIF (7 bits)
BSIF (8 bits)
BSIF (9 bits)
BSIF (10 bits)
BSIF (11 bits)
BSIF (12 bits)
(c)
4
6
8
10
12
5
10
15
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Bits number
BSIF − Features extraction mean time
Windows size
Av
er
ag
e 
tim
e 
(se
c)
(d)
Figure 5.2: Average ROC Curves for the BSIF with a (5x5) window size and 12 bits compared
with LPQ and LBP (a), with different window sizes and best bit length (12 bits) (b), with dif-
ferent bit length and best window sizes (5x5 pixels) (c) and BSIF features extraction times
(sec) in a 3D graph (d).
A full overview of the performance of the classifier is given by the ROC curves, which
plot the Ferrfake-Ferrlive pair for all possible threshold values in the range [0,1]. For sake
of space, since the curves are very similar between them, we only present the average re-
sults obtained from all ten datasets (using the average values of Ferrfake and Ferrlive). In
particular we plotted:
• Figs. 5.2 (a): average LPQ, LBP and best BSIF ROC in order to compare our proposal
against state-of-the-art algorithms. “Best" BSIF means that we selected, for each data
set, the feature vector that was extracted with a 5x5 windows size and a 12 bit length.
• Figs. 5.2 (b): average BSIF ROCs by setting the best value of bits number (12 bits) and
varying the window size, for each data set, in order to evaluate the dependency of BSIF
performance on the window size parameter.
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• Figs. 5.2 (c): average BSIF ROCs by setting the best value of window size (5x5 window)
and varying the bits number, for each data set, in order to evaluate the dependency of
BSIF performance on the bits number parameter.
Mean Standard Deviation
LBP 1.79 0.83
LPQ 4.43 2.66
BSIF 0.58 0.34
Table 5.1: LBP, LPQ and BSIF (5x5 win, 12 bits) mean and standard deviation of the compu-
tational time (sec).
Finally, Fig. 5.2(d) shows the computational time as function of the BSIF parameters. An
average value is also given in Tab. 5.1, and compared with that of LPQ and LBP. It can be
noticed that it increases with both window size and bits number, but this second parame-
ter is the most relevant. However, it is noticeable that computational time is much better
than that of LPQ, comparable with that of LBP in the worst case, and considerably less when
considering the best BSIF configuration (Tab. 5.1).
All the results have been computed on a platform based on Matlab 7.9.0 r2009b, Windows
7 PRO 64 bit, Pentium(R) Dual-Core CPU ES200 @ 2.50GHz 8 GB2.
Figure 5.3: Some fingerprint images collected with the Italdata sensor.
From Figs. 5.2 (a), it is evident that the BSIF performance is superior than that of the LPQ
and the LBP algorithms. The only exception is given by the performance on the Italdata data
2Matlab, Windows, Pentium are property of Mathworks, Microsoft, Intel, respectively. Source codes of LBP,
LPQ and BSIF is available at the following website: http://www.cse.oulu.fi/CMV/Research.
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sets (Tab. 5.3), which appears to be only slightly better than of the LPQ. This can be explained
by the fact that Italdata images are automatically pre-processed during the acquisition step
which is impossible to be avoided. Therefore, we can suppose a certain loss of details making
Italdata images apparently “cleaner” than those acquired with other sensors, as shown in
Fig. 5.3, with a sort of visible “blurring effect” that helps explaining why a blurring invariant
algorithm like LPQ equates the BSIF in this case [56]. In general, the very good performance
of BSIF confirmed the results reported in [17].
Algorithm Biometrika Italdata Swipe
MSBSIF (90% energy) 1.00 0.50 3.05
MSBSIF (95% energy) 1.05 0.50 3.20
MSBSIF (99% energy) 1.05 0.50 3.65
BSIF 0.55 0.60 4.76
LBP [45] 1.30 3.35 18.96
LPQ [56] 2.15 1.45 9.65
Table 5.2: Average Classification Error (ACE) values comparison for the LivDet 2013 datasets.
The BSIF features were extracted with a 5x5 windows size and a 12 bit length.
Tables 5.2-5.4 point out that the BSIF outperform all of the others state-of-the-art algo-
rithms with the only partial exception of the two Multi-Scale LBP algorithms on the 2011
datasets (Table 5.3). As a matter of fact the MSLBP1 performances are much better than
those of the BSIF for the Digital dataset and slightly better for the Sagem dataset, the MSLBP2
performances are similar to those of the BSIF for the Italdata dataset and slightly better for
the Sagem dataset. For this reason we extended our work on the BSIF focusing on the fusion
of feature vectors extracted at different window sizes as already done with the original LBP
algorithm. In the first three rows of Tables 5.2-5.4 we inserted the results obtained using the
fusion of features after a PCA features reduction using as stopping criterion the cumulative
energy content at 90%, 95% and 99%.
Results show a general error reduction with respect to the BSIF algoritm with the only
exception of the Biometrika sensor in 2013 (Table 5.2) and in 2009 (Table 5.4). In both cases
this is probably due to the fact that the results for the different window sizes are unbalanced
with those obtained for a 5x5 window size much better than the others. Therefore, instead
of an improvement, we notice a deterioration of the results.
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Algorithm Biometrika Italdata Digital Sagem
MSBSIF (90% energy) 4.65 9.70 1.70 3.90
MSBSIF (95% energy) 4.45 9.85 1.70 3.80
MSBSIF (99% energy) 4.40 9.60 1.80 3.80
BSIF 6.15 12.60 4.00 5.91
LBP [45] 11.20 18.45 10.60 8.51
LPQ [56] 14.70 13.60 11.45 8.01
MSLBP1 [29] 7.30 14.80 2.50 5.30
MSLBP2 [29] 10.60 12.60 6.70 5.60
WLD [22] 13.25 27.67 13.75 6.66
Table 5.3: Average Classification Error (ACE) values comparison for the LivDet 2011 datasets.
The BSIF features were extracted with a 5x5 windows size and a 12 bit length.
Tabs. 5.2 and 5.3 also point out a strong performance difference on Biometrika and Ital-
data data sets between edition 2011 and 2013 of LivDet which can be explained by the fact
that these data sets for LivDet 2013 were made up of fake fingerprint images provided by la-
tent prints. As a matter of fact, the third edition of LivDet [20] was also aimed to compare
liveness detectors when facing more realistic spoofing trials. However also in this case it can
be noted that BSIF performance is far better than that of LBP and LPQ.
Figs. 5.2(b-c) show the BSIF performance as functions of the windows size and bits num-
ber parameters. With regard to the window size (Fig. 5.2(b)), the performance trend appears
as generally decreasing with it: the smaller the window size, the better the performance.
However, it should be observed a performance decrease, beyond a certain size. This means
that each data set/sensor requires a careful calibration of this parameter, due to the differ-
ence of the images captured.
With regard to the bits number (Figs 5.2(c)), the trend is strongly increasing: the higher
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Algorithm Biometrika CrossMatch Identix
MSBSIF (90% energy) 6.86 3.33 0.78
MSBSIF (95% energy) 6.86 3.40 0.51
MSBSIF (99% energy) 6.96 3.50 0.42
BSIF 3.45 4.58 1.02
LBP [45] 19.09 10.25 4.04
LPQ [56] 6.51 5.98 2.27
WLD[22] 1.16 5.70 2.00
QRF [15] 37.40 14.80 4.90
PMBF [34] 12.60 15.20 9.70
Table 5.4: Average Classification Error (ACE) values comparison for the LivDet 2009 datasets.
The BSIF features were extracted with a 5x5 windows size and a 12 bit length. QRF stands for
Quality Related Features [15] and PMBF for Perspiration- and Morphology-Based Features
[34]
the number the better the performance. Among the analyzed datasets there are no excep-
tions for this trend. It seems that the optimal number of bits is 10-12. This is motivated by the
fact that the number of bits defines the expressive power of the BSIF feature vector because
it represents the number of filters as well as the number of possible filter configurations re-
sponses, that is, the textural configurations on each subimage.
As in the case of the window size, we have a similar behavior for the number of bits. As a
matter of fact, it could be supposed that, by increasing this number, we should always obtain
a correspondent performance improvement. But Fig. 5.4 clearly shows a sort of saturation
effect beyond a certain bits number. Therefore, the number of bits points out an intrinsic
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Figure 5.4: Decrease of the Average Error Rate as the bit length grows.
limitation of the BSIF method. We suppose that this “limit” is correlated with the resolution
of each image, but we have not yet a clear evidence about that, since all LivDet sensors are
characterized by the same resolution in terms of dpi. In other words, we believe that a higher
resolution could lead to a higher "optimal" number of bits, due to the increase of details
detectable in the image.
In our opinion, the very good performance of BSIFs, and the clear indication that this is
obtained by using a very small window size (5x5 pixels) with a large number of bits are the
most concrete evidence that differences between live and fake fingerprints are embedded in
minute details that cannot be visible even by human experts. Filters learnt from natural im-
ages allow capturing many of these details, thus leading to a performance far better than that
of other algorithms which use a less flexible approach to derive filters and textural templates.
5.4 “User-Specific” experimental results
Results presented in the previous section prove that FLD is still an open issue. We will show
by experiments that the user-specific approach can be of great help in the improvement of a
detector performances. In our analysis we first bring some evidence of this effect and then
we propose a method that takes advantage of it.
5.4.1 Generic-user vs. user-specific Fingerprint Liveness De-
tection
In this Section, we show by experiments the user-specific effect using a simple discriminative
approach to FLD. Given the feature vector, we trained a Nearest Neighbour (NN) classifier
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and a linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) according to the standard generic-user method.
In parallel, we trained the same classifiers using the user-specific method, namely, the train-
ing set is made up of live and fake samples of the targeted user population. The adopted
data sets are the four ones of the Second Edition of the International Fingerprint Liveness
Detection (LivDet2011 [59]). Let’s indicate the client set in a certain LivDet data set with Ω .
Firstly, we randomly partitioned Ω into Ω1 and Ω2, with Ω1∩Ω2 =φ, and Ω1∪Ω2 =Ω. Let’s
extract all live and fake samples belonging to clients inΩ1, thus generating the subset of im-
ages D1. The same is done withΩ2, thus generating D2. Finally, let’s partition D1 in D
(1)
1 and
D (2)1 such that different samples of clients in Ω1 are present. We obtained three sets, which
are intended as follows:
• D (1)1 is the user-specific training set, made up of samples from the targeted population,
namely, the one inΩ1. This set is used for training the user-specific classifiers;
• D2 is the generic-user training set, made up of samples from another, generic popula-
tion. This set is used for training the generic-user classifiers;
• D (2)1 is the user-specific test set, made up of samples from the targeted populationΩ1.
This set is used to test the performance of classifiers above.
BIOMETRIKA KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 19.99 16.06
Internal train 5.73 10.71
ITALDATA KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 33.02 25.24
Internal train 9.43 13.91
DIGITAL KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 24.35 17.21
Internal train 5.35 11.07
SAGEM KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 12.31 7.09
Internal train 3.40 5.70
Table 5.5: Percentage classification rate using the LBP feature set.
According to this protocol, D2 is averagely two times bigger than D
(1)
1 , thus the generic-
user population is more dense than the user-specific one in the feature space. We repeated
this procedure for ten runs and averaged results in Tables 5.5 - 5.7. Reported results are
impressive, because they show at which extent the user-specific contribution can improve
the performance of the system under the targeted user population.
Potentially, if well-exploited, the user-specific contribution may lead to a very high clas-
sification rate, with values which have not yet been attained by any FLD algorithm proposed
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BIOMETRIKA KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 30.43 18.56
Internal train 8.00 7.58
ITALDATA KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 29.63 24.35
Internal train 10.37 6.79
DIGITAL KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 22.40 14.10
Internal train 3.57 8.87
SAGEM KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 15.85 10.34
Internal train 2.99 6.51
Table 5.6: Percentage classification rate using the LPQ feature set.
so far in these LivDet datasets [11, 32, 52]. In order to explain such astonishing results, at
least on the observed data, we must consider that a live/fake sample from a certain user can
be closer to live/fake samples of the same user but also closer to a fake/live of another. This
impacts on the inter-intra class variability. Such effect can be measured according to what
reported in Table 5.8. We reported the output of an extensive analysis of clients distribu-
tions along the LivDet 2011 data sets and is currently under extension on the others LivDet
datasets.
Let’s see the live class first. The “NN live” column reports the percentage of live sample
whose nearest neighbour is another live sample. The “NN live from same user” column re-
ports the fraction of above live samples which comes from the same user. It is worth noting
that many samples, on average, are closest to samples of the same user. But this is not the
rule: in a certain sense, this tells us that all features adopted are good liveness measurements
and, according to the generic-user method, they are not too much distinctive on the specific
users. Where the descriptor is more effective, namely, in the BSIF case, the “user-specific”
component is more present.
Different observations can be done from the fake class. The “NN fake” column of Table
5.8 reports the percentage of fake samples whose nearest neigbour is another fake sample.
The “NN fake from same user” is the fraction over the above samples, of images whose fake
is closest to another one of the same user. Finally, the “NN fake of same user from same
material” is the fraction of those samples nearest to a sample of the same material. It is evi-
dent that the dependency on the same user is very noticeable for fake samples. This means
that having fake samples of the same targeted user appears more important than collecting
his/her live samples. This may be due to the fact that a replica removes some textural infor-
mation of the user’s alive fingerprint, but it is also able to add novel, user-specific textural
information, although “spoofed”. We believe that this spoofed information can be referred
to the artifacts peculiar of each material, on the basis of what Table 5.8 reports in the last
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BIOMETRIKA KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 28.10 18.13
Internal train 5.01 2.14
ITALDATA KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 33.39 20.05
Internal train 7.29 2.18
DIGITAL KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 21.97 6.73
Internal train 1.86 1.06
SAGEM KNN (k=1) SVM (lin.)
External train 11.07 6.05
Internal train 2.48 1.76
Table 5.7: Percentage classification rate using the BSIF (window 5x5, 12 bit) feature set.
column: the closeness to the same user’s fake fingerprint is coupled with the fact that that
fingerprint is also close to one made up of the same material, but “far” from a corresponding
live finger. Our hypothesis is that the “response” of the finger skin to a mold/cast combi-
nation is different from each person, thus leading to “user-specific” replica which is “more”
than expected: it is not a simple replica, but a “novel” identity from the liveness perspective.
This explains the performance difference when adopting the generic user approach, even if
the materials used for the fake fingerprints are the same employed by the attacker.
5.4.2 Feature analysis
The experiments carried out so far have shown that some of the features used for liveness
detection not only capture the intrinsic characteristics of “live” and “fake”, but also capture
texture characteristics that distinguish a “client” from another. A reasonable hypothesis is to
provide that the features are arranged in such a way as to characterize “live” and “fake”, but
that their distribution is also related to the particular “client”. As a matter of fact, if you study
and try to discern the distribution of live and fake, with no distinction between the client, you
will find that these distributions are superimposed: both “live” and “fake” show a spreading
throughout almost all of the allowable range. An analysis of these distributions, however,
will highlight small groupings of features. These groupings determine overlaps between fake
samples of some material other live samples. What, however, we still had not noticed is
that some fake samples are superimposed, in the feature space, to live samples of different
clients, whose fakes are much less overlapped.
In the following examples, we put some figures of four different clients. Figures 5.5 (a-d)
show the spread plot of the first two PCA features of four client of the Biometrika LivDet 2011
dataset [59]. In the images we have differentiated the live (circles) from fake (asterisks). As
you can see, fake and live of the same user are well separated for red and blue users but not
50 CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
for green and cyan users.
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Figure 5.5: Separated spread plots of the fist two PCA features of four users of the LivDet 2011
dataset [59].
We can assume that in the first two cases 5.5 (a-b) we can easily train a classifier able to
discriminate between live and fake, while in the other two we will get some error. If we put
together the spread plot of the red and blue users, we can see that the live samples of the
blue, one in particular, are very close to some fake samples of the red 5.6 (a). In the case of
green and cyan the confusion is even higher and some live samples of both colors, which
were originally isolated, are superimposed to fakes of the other color 5.6 (b).
But if we put together all these distributions, as is usually done, you will get a distribution
much more difficult to characterize. Many live samples of one client can be very close to the
fakes of many other clients (or some fake to other lives) 5.7.
This is because information “related” to each client quite often properly “isolate” fake
and live, but the user-specific information become an obstacle to the correct classification
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Figure 5.6: Spread plots of the fist two PCA features of red and blue user (a) and green and
cyan user (b) of the LivDet 2011 dataset [59].
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Figure 5.7: United spread plots of the fist two PCA features of four users of the LivDet 2011
dataset [59].
of the samples when they are treated as a single distribution. We consider this user-specific
information as a bias that we would like to eliminate. The purpose of our work is thus to
“de-personalize”, that is eliminate or reduce, the user-specific component that characterizes
the chosen features. As previously noted, this characteristic invests all feature set considered
so far, namely LBP, LPQ and BSIF, on which we will continue our analysis.
5.4.3 User shifting
The classification problem just analyzed it would simplify if we could turn it into a problem
in which the live samples were “grouped” together, regardless of the client. Our hypothesis is
the following: each single feature of the chosen feature set is characterized by a component
inherently distinctive of the live or fake nature of the fingerprint to which is added a com-
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ponent characterizing the particular client. In order to remove or reduce this component,
we propose to subtract from each feature (of live or fake samples) a value corresponding to
the average of the corresponding values of that feature on all live samples. The effect of this
shift will be that while the feature of the live class of a given client will now present a zero
mean, the respective fake will be shifted by a constant amount. Considering the entire fea-
ture set, all the live samples will be centered around the origin, being all at zero mean, while
fake samples will be moved on the margins of the various distributions. The result will be
a general increase in the separability between live and fake samples, with a lower probabil-
ity of overlapping between the fakes of a given client with the lives of another. In Figure5.8
it is evident that the live samples are centered around the origin while the fake are moved
outside.
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Figure 5.8: United spread plots of the fist two shifted PCA features of four users of the LivDet
2011 dataset [59].
5.4.4 Experimental results
We investigated the effectiveness of our approach on the Biometrika and Italdata data sets
of LivDet 2011 [59]. Beside the analogue data sets of LivDet2013 [20], these are the only ones
in which live samples of all the user population are always available. Each LivDet 2011 data
set is made up of 4000 images per class (2000 live and 2000 fake), collected over 80 different
people. For each finger there are five live and a varying number of fake acquisitions. We
strictly followed the LivDet protocol which imposes using the first 2000 images as training
set and the remainder as test set, where images in this set come from users not present in the
training set. This protocol assures that “general-purpose” systems are trained and tested.
In order to analyze our proposal, we had to modify the LivDet protocol as follows. For
each user in the training set, we computed by using the sample mean over all available live
samples. Then, we removed such component from all live and fake fingerprint images of the
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related user. The obtained feature set, characterized now by a zero mean for the live samples
of each user, is used for training a linear SVM classifier.
In the test phase, the mean for each user was computed using a similar procedure (live
patterns of the user population are always available in real fingerprint verification systems,
thus this procedure is completely fair) and subtracted to the related value of each feature
vector. The obtained test set is used for evaluating the performance of the system. The only
difference is that, since there are five live samples for each finger, in the test phase we ran-
domly selected three feature vectors to compute the mean for each user and leaved the re-
maining two in the dataset. Basically, in a test dataset composed of 1000 lives and 1000 fakes,
we use 600 lives to compute the mean vectors and we classify the remaining 1400 samples
(400 lives and 1000 fakes). Results are compared with those obtained classifying the same
1400 samples without the mean subtraction, namely the original samples.
Performance is reported in terms of ROC curves, namely the plot of the True Positive
Rate (percentage of live fingerprints correctly classified) and False Positive Rate (percentage
of fake fingerprints wrongly classified). Results for both Biometrika and Italdata datasets are
reported in Figures 5.9 (a,b) using the LBP, Figures 5.10 (a,b) using the LPQ and Figures 5.11
(a,b) using the BSIF with a 5x5 window size and 12 bits.
In Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 we also present the EER (Equal Error Rate) computed on the
shifted and on the original feature vectors extracted with the LBP, LPQ and BSIF (with a 5x5
window size and 12 bits) algorithms.
In all cases, we can see a noticeable improvement of the performance with respect to
the standard design protocol. This suggests that proposed method is effective in removing,
partially at least, the user specific component from the related feature vector. It is worth
noting that this method does not require collection of fake data from the user population
taken into account, and training and design, once the user specific component is removed,
can be done by following the usual procedure.
On the other hand, the same plots show that this improvement is not systematic, that
is, it is not effective for all operational points. The reasons for this can be due to the strong
hypothesis behind our model, in particular, the choice of the model of the user-specific com-
ponent. If the basic assumption of our work is true, that is, a user-specific component exists
into textural descriptors as LBP, LPQ and BSIF, modelling this relationship appropriately is
the main issue.
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Figure 5.9: Roc curves computed for the general-purpose and the user-specific case using
the LBP algorithm on the Biometrika and Italdata LivDet 2011 dataset [59].
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Live Fake
NN live NN live
from
same user
NN fake NN fake
from
same user
NN fake
of same
user from
same
material
LBP
Biometrika 93,6% 18,5% 99,2% 96,4% 99,3%
Italdata 88,6% 17,1% 99,0% 96,1% 98,9%
Digital 96,7% 79,5% 98,5% 88,8% 100,0%
Sagem 97,7% 59,6% 98,9% 89,6% 98,7%
LPQ
Biometrika 87,2% 21,1% 99,4% 93,6% 98,7%
Italdata 87,0% 22,9% 98,9% 92,8% 98,0%
Digital 96,3% 79,3% 98,5% 84,1% 99,9%
Sagem 97,5% 70,5% 99,3% 91,7% 98,7%
BSIF
Biometrika 95,8% 46,5% 99,8% 99,6% 99,3%
Italdata 91,2% 44,4% 99,5% 97,9% 98,9%
Digital 98,9% 91,6% 99,9% 95,4% 99,9%
Sagem 98,0% 82,0% 99,3% 93,9% 98,4%
Table 5.8: For each of three textural feature sets investigated, the “NN live” column reports
the percentage of live sample whose nearest neighbour is another live sample; the “NN live
from the same user” column reports the fraction of above live samples which comes from
the same user; the “NN fake” column reports the percentage of fake samples whose nearest
neighbour is another fake sample; the “NN fake from same user” is the fraction over the
above samples, of images whose fake is closer to another one of the same user; the “NN fake
of same user from same material” is the fraction of samples nearest to a sample of the same
material.
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Figure 5.10: Roc curves computed for the general-purpose and the user-specific case using
the LPQ algorithm on the Biometrika and Italdata LivDet 2011 dataset [59].
Biometrika Italdata
EER shifted feat. 8.36 13.07
EER original feat. 10.66 19.04
Table 5.9: EER computed on the shifted and on the original LBP feature vectors
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Figure 5.11: Roc curves computed for the general-purpose and the user-specific case us-
ing the BSIF (with a 5x5 window size and 12 bits) algorithm on the Biometrika and Italdata
LivDet 2011 dataset [59].
Biometrika Italdata
EER shifted feat. 13.45 11.11
EER original feat. 14.18 14.14
Table 5.10: EER computed on the shifted and on the original LPQ feature vectors
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Biometrika Italdata
EER shifted feat. 5.17 10.05
EER original feat. 6.37 12.31
Table 5.11: EER computed on the shifted and on the original BSIF (with a 5x5 window size
and 12 bits) feature vectors
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
During the last three years I thoroughly explored the state-of-the-art of the FLD paying par-
ticular attention to the textural feature descriptors. I worked on the introduction of the LPQ
and the BSIF in the FLD field carrying out a deep comparison with the other algorithms as
well as an analysis of pros and cons depending on the algorithm’s parameters. Results are
very interesting because the proposed algorithms were comparable the state-of-the-art in
terms of performance in the case of the LPQ, and outperformed the state-of-the-art in terms
of performance and computational time in the case of the BSIF.
The main open discussion is related to set the optimal parameters for the BSIF extraction.
Our analysis over ten data sets showed that the best values converge to be the same. In par-
ticular, performance does not vary appreciably over a certain window size and bits number,
thus it could be stated that, for the FLD application, setting the windows size to 5x5 pixels
and the bits number to 11-12, leads to a more than reasonable trade-off in terms of compu-
tational time and performance. It should be noted that the characteristics of the considered
fingerprints sensors were more or less the same for all data sets (around 500 dpi of resolution
and gray-level images extracted), thus reported results are consistent. Nonetheless, we could
expect that the parameters values could change when, for example, sensors significantly dif-
ferent in terms of dpi were available. It is true that, so far, the majority of fingerprint sensors
on the market are similar to those investigated in this thesis, and the standard in this field is
set to 500 dpi of resolution and 8-bit sized gray-level values. Anyhow, a specific investigation
aimed to point out pros and cons of BSIF according to different kinds of
fingerprint sensors should be done in the future.
Another interesting focus of attention is on the filters derived from natural images. As it
has been shown here by experiments it is true that they allow to compute a feature vector
whose expressive power is more than that of, let’s say, LBP. However, it might be possible that
learning filters specialized on live and fake fingerprint images could lead to further, signif-
icant improvements. This is an on-going work that makes BSIF approach for FLD worth of
further investigations. To sum up, thanks to its very good performance and computational
time, the BSIF represents a significant step ahead to the real integration of a fingerprint live-
ness detector into a personal verification system.
An important step ahead in this direction was the introduction of the Multi-Scale BSIF.
The first step to reduce the feature number with the PCA was necessary because of the large
size of the feature vector and the subsequent feature fusion led, in almost all of the analyzed
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cases, to a significant accuracy improvement. The features reduction was performed using
the 90%, 95% and 99% of the cumulative energy content and results were very similar but an
deeper analysis of the feature selection criteria must be done carefully, evaluating the better
size of each feature vector, the individual performance, and the real complementarity of the
selected data.
I also investigated an interesting effect suggested by some empirical evidences which
partially motivates the bad performance of current fingerprint liveness detectors using tex-
tural features: the presence of “user-specific” components. In particular, I analyzed LBP, LPQ
and BSIF algorithms since they exhibited some of the best performance. We also proposed
a model for trying to remove this component from the feature vectors. The proposed model
is based on assumptions worthy to be analyzed in depth and this is what we are doing in
these days. In particular, we are trying to obtain further evidences about the “user-specific”
presence. Preliminary results seem to indicate that our approach is correct. With a simple
translation of the feature based on the calculation of the average of the live feature vector
of each user, it is possible to obtain an error reduction. If this would be confirmed, it im-
plies that the design protocol, which we called “general-purpose” here, should be partially
modified in order to “filter” the user-specific component from the feature vectors before the
training phase. We believe that what we pointed out in this thesis marks the beginning of a
new topic, which must be deeply investigated in future works for allowing an effective design
of fingerprint liveness detector and leading to a performance acceptable for their integration
in fingerprint verification systems.
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